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INFORMATION REPORT

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SUBJECT Political Moves of the Pro-Soviet Bloc in the North Korean Government

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SUPPLEMENT TO
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1. The Korea Labor Party, which was officially composed of equal numbers of North and South Korean Labor Party personnel, was actually heavily weighted on the North Korean side. Although two of the deputy chairmen, PAK Hon-yong and YI Sung-yop, represented the South Korean Labor Party (SKLP), the North Korean deputy chairman HO Ka-i handled all business of importance. In both the Central Committee and the Supplementary Committee of the merged labor parties, the North Koreans maintained a ratio of three to one over the South Koreans by reserving most of the seats (40 and 20 respectively) for delegates of the farmers' and workers' organizations.
2. A concession was made by HO Ka-i to the "native" Communist group* in the appointment of KIM IL (金日成), chairman of the South Hamgyong Province Committee, as head of the organization section. When HO Ka-i was promoted from head of the NKLP supervision committee to vice-chairmanship of the party, he made CHANG Sa-myong (张顺明), former chairman of the North Hamgyong Province Committee, his successor. CHANG, who had been in jail in Taejon, was not particularly well-known, but he was a native Communist who had access to KIM Il-song's group. KIM Il was a close friend of CHANG.
3. Propaganda within the party was also controlled by a KIM Il-song supporter. PAK Chang-ok (朴昌植), former propaganda chief of the Ukrainian Communist Party, had been one of the highest ranking Koreans in the USSR. He was sent to Korea about 1947 with comprehensive instructions from the USSR to take over the land reform program, which had been botched by O Ki-sop (宋基燮), and manage it. After completing the land reform work, PAK transferred to the propaganda section to support KIM Il-song in his efforts to neutralize both the native Communist and the pro-Chinese faction. KIM Chang-man (金昌满), a pro-Chinese, was removed from the propaganda section to become chief of the staff training school of the party.
4. Both O Ki-sop, representing the SKLP, and KIM Mu-chong, the strongest figure in the Chinese faction, were removed from important positions over the land reform program.** Other leaders not adhering to the Soviet bloc were about

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the same time relegated from important party positions to posts as professors at KIM Il-sung University or the North Korean Agricultural College, or to less influential party jobs. Among those so demoted were HAN Pin (韓品), deputy chairman of the China-Korea Independence Alliance, who was released from the party because of alleged unsatisfactory handling of finances and became a professor at KIM Il-sung University; YI Sun-kun (李孫坤), aide of PAK Hŏn-yŏng, removed as chief of the agriculture and forestry section; CH'OE Yong-tal (崔溶達), formulator of the North Korean judicial organization, removed as Minister of Justice; and YI Kang-suk (李康國), removed as chief of the foreign section. They were replaced with some native Communists, with the net result that not one important position was outside the pro-Soviet bloc.

5. To dispose completely of any South Korean or Chinese sympathizers within the party, the able leaders who might have threatened the controlling power were selected for guerrilla warfare in South Korea, where their lives would almost certainly be sacrificed. However unsuited to guerrilla warfare, these leaders were dispatched: YI Hyo-che (李孝濟), former chairman of the South Korean Youth Alliance, was killed near Samchok, and the philosopher PAK Chi-yu (朴致祐) was killed at Odse-san.
6. With the commencement of the war in June 1950, conflicts within the Korea Labor party were naturally intensified, as both pro-Soviet and South Korean elements fought for rule in the occupied portions of South Korea. PAK Hŏn-yŏng, who had all but lost his underground organization in South Korea with the arrest of his agents KIM Sam-yong (金三龍) and YI Chu-ha (李菊河)****, was eager to re-establish a political base in the south and planned to attach his men as political officers with North Korean military units. His plans were frustrated by HO Ka-i, who claimed sole charge of dispatching political organizers to South Korea, with the arguments that because there were no insurrections of South Koreans in conjunction with the North Korean advance, no SKLP organization existed in the south; and that exiled South Koreans in the north would be discredited to their friends at home and could not be counted on for such important missions as political organization.
7. The controversy over control of the south delayed the selection of a chairman for the Seoul City Committee. Eventually two former SKLP leaders, YI Sung-yop (李承燾) and KIM Ung-min (金應敏), were appointed chairman and deputy chairman respectively, but all other important provincial and local positions were reserved for the pro-Soviet faction's nominees. Qualification tests for office were all handled by the NKLP pro-Soviet group. There continued to be differences on policy within the southern occupation government, particularly with regard to the treatment of South Korean Communists. The SKLP group felt that Communists who had backslid but confessed their error and reaffirmed their allegiance to the party should be granted amnesty and used in the government. The pro-Soviet group, on the other hand, wanted to jail most of the doubtful Communists. To preserve some sort of organization of the SKLP supporters, PAK Hŏn-yŏng proposed to organize them into a guerrilla unit, which included even his most important men. He was permitted to do so, since KIM Il-sung already had his friend KIM Ch'ak as front line commander, and partly since the war in South Korea was not proceeding as the North Koreans had expected.
8. After the succession of military movements resulting in the UN withdrawal to the south in late October, the Korea Labor Party required a complete reorganization. They organized a series of "self-criticism" meetings, in which the blame for the military situation was pushed off on the non-Soviet group. The party leaders, in an official conference on 23 December,***** not only purged KIM Mu-chŏng and HO Song-t'ak but accused the SKLP of failure to support the North Korean action. The SKLP did not admit the charge but chose as scapegoat the chairman of the North Kangwon Province Committee, who was expelled. The provincial chairmen in all areas were appraised, and those of the pro-Soviet group were commended. No difference of opinion was permitted from any other faction.

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Comment. The principal factions of the Korean Communists are the pro-Soviet, the Chinese-trained (Yenan) group, and the native Communists who remained in Korea and were not trained abroad.

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Comment.

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Comment. According to [REDACTED] YI Kang-kuk was an active worker with PAK Han-yong for the South Korean Labor Party immediately after the Second World War. He was also a member of the North Korean People's Committee. He was accused of disloyalty to the party line and deviationism; the Korean Communists felt that he had strayed from the party line. Because of these charges of disloyalty, he was required to take a period of study and reorientation before being received into the party councils again; therefore, he was sent to Moscow in the late fall of 1949 for a retraining course in the Communist ideology.

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Comment. Both these agents were arrested by the ROK police and executed before the evacuation of Seoul in June 1950.


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Comment. A detailed account of this meeting and the unofficial conference which preceded it is given [REDACTED]

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ATTACHMENT 1



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